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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANN B. HOPKINS
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
(Gesell, J.)

v.

84-3040

PRICE WATERHOUSE
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
'r

1. The Court reaffirms and incorporates by reference its

Septe ber 20, 1985 findings of fact on liability, Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 1109, 1111-1118 (D.D.C. 1985), and adopts

the Supreme Court's formulation that sex-lin ed discriminatory
evaluations of plaintiff as a 1983 candidate for admission to
partnership constituted a substantial factor" in defendant s
decision to place her candidacy on hold, -i/ The Supreme Court's
remand directs this Court to determine on the existing record
whether defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same hold decision even if it had not taken

JL/ This finding was implicit in the Court's 1985 findings on
liability. While the plurality opinion in the Supreme Court uses
the phrase motivating part to describe the causal role that
discriminatory evaluations of plaintiff played in the hold
decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,

U.S.

, 109 S.Ct.

1775, 1787, 1795, the concurring and dissenting opinions use the
phrase substantial factor. 3[d. , 109 S.Ct. at 1795, 1803-1805,
1806. The five votes represented by these opinions suggest that
the substantial factor wording will be favored henceforth in
mixed-motive cases such as this one, although in the past the
Supreme Court has treated the terms substantial factor and
motivating factor as equivalents. Mt. Healthy School District
Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).

these discriminatory evaluations and plaintiff s sex into account.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. at 1793, 1975, 1806.

2. Defendant has ac nowledged that concerns about plaintiff s
interpersonal skills were the deter inative reason for the fir 's
hold decision. See 618 F.Supp. at 1115.

3. The partner comments which criticized plaintiff's
interpersonal skills include those that reflect sexual stereotyping
as well as some that do not. See 618 F.Supp. at 1114 and 1117 and
accompanying record references.

4. Because Price Waterhouse permitted and gave substantial
weight to biased criticisms of plaintiff and other women candidates,
and because it made no effort to investigate and discard, where

appropriate, comments that suggested a double standard, 618 F.Supp.
at 1119-1120, it is not possible on this record to determine the
particular weight which the firm's Admissions Committee and Policy
Board gave to such criticisms in plaintiff's case.
5. The problem is illustrated by the de bene esse deposition
testimony of Joseph E. Connor, who in 1983 was Price Waterhouse's
Managing Partner and the Chairman of its Policy Board. Mr. Connor
had taken a personal interest in the firm's Office of Govern ent
Services where plaintiff worked. He knew her and knew of her
work. J. Connor Dep. 22-27. He felt they had a good personal

relationship and he enjoyed her company. Jtd. at 58. As an
individual, I thought she was fine. Id. at 94. Mr. Connor said he
was surprised and disappointed with the widespread nature and
intensity of the individual negative comments on Ann. I thought she
would have a different row to hoe on this one because she had done a
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good job. I was not aware of these problems that others began to
point out.

Id. at 88. As a result, although he was a supporter of

plaintiff s candidacy for partner, within the Policy Board, Mr.
Connor voted for a

hold.

Id. at 43. Mr. Connor evidently made no

attempt to evaluate the negative com ents in terms of sex bias or
stereotyping. He reacted to them as a whole. Id. at 103-104.

6. Mr. Connor acknowledged that "those who had less than full
time involvement with Ann, were the deciders on this one." Id. at

62. Seven of the eight "no" votes by individual partners on
plaintiff's candidacy were by partners who had limited contact with
her and therefore filled out short form evaluations. Def. Ex. 27;
Tr. 245. See 618 F.Supp. at 1119. The numerical ratings as well as

comments of these short form critics focused on plaintiff's
personality and had little to say about her practice and anage ent
skills, in comparison with those partners who filled out long for s
because they knew plaintiff better and had had more work contacts
with her. The long form comments contained only one no vote, Def.
Ex. 27.

7. The record makes it impossible for an outsider to parse the
relative weight which the Admissions Committee and Policy Board
members gave to negative comments about plaintiff that were tainted
by stereotyped attitudes and those that were not, but the Court has
no reason to believe that Mr. Connor's approach was not

representative. It is also appropriate to accord special credence
and weight to the advice given plaintiff by Thomas Beyer, the
partner who knew exactly where the problems were with her
candidacy and had the responsibility of telling her what they were.
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Tr. 316 (Marcellin); see also Tr. 253-254 (Ziegler). Mr. Beyers
advice to plaintiff clearly reflected his understanding that greater
femininity on her part would overco e the hold decision.
Conversely, it was a perceived lack of femininity that had caused
that decision. As was previously noted, he advised plaintiff to
wal more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. See 618
F.Supp. at 1117.

8. The Court also notes that in her testimony Dr. Susan Fiske
identified comments by male partners on plaintiff's candidacy which
were not overtly sexist in content but which she believed were
influenced by sex stereotypes. See Tr. 560, 578-579, 583, 591.

Although sex stereotyping is often a subtle and unconscious form of
discrimination, 618 F. Supp. at 1117-1118, the Court finds it
unnecessary to determine the validity of Dr. Fiske's opinions
concerning individual comments which fall into this category,
because the burden of proof lies with defendant at this stage.
However, her testimony points up the difficulty defendant confronts
in identifying those comments that should be disregarded and those
that should not be in light of the Supreme Court mandate. The
problem is one of defendant's own making since it never took any
steps to discourage sexual bias or to attempt to investigate which
comments were so infected and deny them weight.
9. Any attempt to reconstruct the partnership decision in
plaintiff's case free of improper bias must end in uncertainty, and
defendant bears the risk of that uncertainty, as the Supreme Court
held. 109 S.ct. at 1790, 1802. See also 618 F.Supp. at 1120.
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10. Defendant has no proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that, absent any consideration of plaintiff s gender or of
those comments which were tainted by sexual stereotyping, it would
have made the same decision to place her candidacy for admission to
partnership on hold.
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